T_ thesis which I humbly submit to criticism is this. If, other things remaining the same, the leading banks of the world were to lower their rate of interest, say 1 per cent. below its ordinary level, and keep it so for some years, then the prices of all commodities would rise and rise and rise without any limit whatever; on the contrary, if the leading banks were to raise their rate of interest, say 1 per cent. above its normal level, and keep it so for some years, then all prices would ]_U and fall and fall without any limit except Zero. Now this proposition cannot be proved directly by experience, because the fact required in its hypothesis never happens.
and of the demand for commodities from the gold-producing countries being the other.
Before going further, however, we must answer one more question. Our supposition might be not only unreal as to facts, but even logically impossible ; and then, of course, its use would be nil. According to the general opinion among economists, the interest on money is regulated in the long run by the profit on capital, which in its turn is de, ermined by the productivity and relative abundance of real capital, or, in the terms of modern political economy, by its marginal productivity.
This remaining the same, as, indeed, by our supposition it is meant to do, would it be at all possible for the banks to keep the rate of interest either higher or lower than its normal level, prescribed by the simultaneous state of the average profit on capital ?
This question deserves very careful consideration, and, in fact, its proper analysis will take us a long way towards solving the whole problem.
Interest on money and profit on capital are not the same thing, nor are they immediately connected with each other; if they were, they could not differ at all, or could only differ a certain amount at every time. There is no doubt some con--necting link between them, but the proper nature and extent of this connection is not so very easy to define.
If we look only at credit transactions between individuals, without any interference of banks, the connection between interest and profit indeed seems obvious. If by investing your capita[ in some industrial enterprise you can get, after due allowance for risk, a profit of, say, 10 per cent., then, of course, you will not lend it at a much cheaper rate; and if the borrower has no recourse but to individuals in the same situation as you, he will not be able to get the money much cheaper than that.
Bat it is a very different thing with the modern forms of credit, which almost always imply the mediation of some bank or professional money-lender.
The banks in their lending business are not only not limited by their own capital; they are not, at least not immediately, limited by any capital whatever; by concentrating in their hands almost all payments, they them; selves create the money required, or, what is the same thing, they accelerate ad l_bitum the rapidity of the circulation of money. The sum borrowed to-day in order to buy commodities is placed by the seller of the goods on his account at the same bank or some other bank, and can be lent the very next day to some other person with the same effect. As the German author,
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Emil Struck, justly saysinhiswell-known sketch oftheEnglish money market: inour daysdemand and supplyof money have become aboutthe same thing,the demand to a largeextent cresting itsown supply. Im a putssystemof credit, where allpaymentswere made by transference in thebank-books, thebanks wouldbe ableto grantat any moment any amount of loansat any, however diminutive, rateofinterest.
But then,what becomes of the connecting linkbetween interest and profit?In my opinion thereisno suchlink, except precisely the effect on pr/ces, which would be causedby their difference.
When interest islow in proportion to the existing rateof profit, and if, as I take it, the prices thereby rise, then, of course, trade will require more sovereigns and bank-notes, and therefore the sums lent will not all come back to the bank, but part of them will remain in the boxes and purses of the public; in consequence, the bank reserves will melt away while the amount of their liabilities very likely has increased, which will force them to raise their rate of interest.
The reverse of all this, of course, will take place when the rate of interest has accidentally become too high in proportion to the average profit on capital. So far, you will easily remark, my proposition is quite in accordance with well-known facts of the money market. If it be not true, if, on the contrary, as Thomas Tooke asserted, and even Ricardo in his earlier writings seems to have believed, a low rate of interest, by cheapening, as they put it, one of the elements of production, would lower prices, and a high rate of interest raise them--a most specious argument, resting, however, on the unwarrantable assumption that the remuneration of the other factors of proclucfion could, under such circumstances, remain the same--then the policy of banks must be the very reverse of what it really is ; they would lower their rates when prices were getting high and reserves becoming low, they would raise them in the opposite case.
A more direct proof of my thesis is required, however, and might be given in some such way as this. If as a merchant I havesoldmy goodsto the amount of _I00 againsta bill or promissory noteofthreemonths,and I getitdiscounted atonce by a bank ora bill broker, therateofdiscount being4 percent. perannum, then in factI have received a cashpriceformy goodsamountingto _99. If,however,the bill istakenby the Q2 THE P.CONOMZC JOU_CAL _UNE bank at 3 per cent., then the cash price of my goods have ipso ]¢acLorisen, if only a quarter of 1 per cent. ; very likely not even that, because competition probably will force me to cede part of my extra profit to the buyer of the goods. In other cases, however, when long-term credit comes into play, the immediate rise of prices might be very much greater than that. If the rate of discount remains low, the interest on long loans is sure to go down too; building companies and railway companies will be able to raise money, say at 4 per cent. instead of 5 per cent., and therefore, other things being the same, they can offer, and by competition will be more or less compelled to offer for wages and materials, anything up to 25 per cent. more than before, 4 per cent. on £1_5 being the same as 5 per cent. on £100.
But, further--and this is the essential point to which I would call your speci_! attention--the upward movement of prices, whether great or small in the first instance, can never cease so long as the rate of interest is kept lower than its normal rate, i.e., the rate consistent with the then existing marginal productivity of real capital. When all commodities have risen in price, a new level o/prices has formed itself which in its turn will serve as basis for atl calculations for the future, and all contracts. Therefore, if the bank-rate now goes up to its normal height, the level of prices will not go down; it will simply remain where it is, there betng no forces in action which could press it down; and, consequently, if the bank-rate rernains Zower than its normal height, a new impetus towards forcing up the prices will follow, and so on. The opposite of all this will take place when the rate of interest has become too high in proportion to average profit, and so in both eases a difference between the two rates remaining, the movement, of prices can never cease, just as the electric current never ceases as long as the difference of tension between the poles remains.
The proposition that a low rate of interest will raise prices, a high rate of interest lower prices, is in some respects anything but new; it has been stated more than once, but a formidable objection was always triumphantly brought against it in the shape of statistical facts; indeed, if you consider the figures given, e.g., 5y Sauerbeck in his well-known tables in the Journal o] _he 8tn_isLical Society, you will generally find that high prices do no_ correspond wt_h a low rate of interest, and vice versa ; it rather" comes the opposite way, interest and prices very often rising and falling together.
But this objection quite loses its importance; nay, more, it turns into a positive supper_ of our
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217 theory, as soon as we fix our eyes on the relativity of the conception of interest on money, its necessary connection with profit on capital. The rate of interest is never high or low in itself, but only in relation to the profit which people can make with the money in their hands, and this, of course, varies. In good times, when trade is brisk, the rate of profit is high, and, what is of great consequence, is generally expected to remain high; in periods of depression it is low, and expected to remain low. The rate of interest on money follows, no doubt, the same course, but not at once, not of itself; it is, as it were, dragged after the rate of profit by the movement of prices and the consequent changes in the state of bank reserve, caused by the difference between the two rates. In the meantime this difference acts on prices in just the same way as would be the case if, according to our original supposition, profit on capital were to remain constant, and interest on money were to rise or fall spontaneously. In one word, the/nterest on money is, in reality, very often low when it seems to be high, and high when it. seems to be low. This I believe to be the proper answer to the objection stated above, as far as the influence of credit on prices is regarded; occasionally, of course, as in times of wild speculation or panics, the problem is complicated very much by the action of other factors, which need not hero be taken in_ consideration.
Granted, then, our theory to be true in the main or in the abstract, what will be its practical consequences _ to what extent would the lcad/ng money institutions be able _o regulate prices ?
A single bank, of course, has no such power whatever; indeed, it cannot put its rates, whether much higher or much lower th._n prescribed by the state of the market; if it did, it would in the former case lose all profitable business; in the latter case its speedy insolvency would be the inevitable consequence.
Not even all the banks of a single country united could do it in the long run ; a too high or too low rate would influence its balance of trade, and thereby cause an influx or reflux of gold in the well-known way, so as to force the banks to apply their rates to the state of the universal money market.
But supposing, as, indeed, we have done, that all the leading banks of the commercial world were to follow the same course, then gold could have no reason to go to one place more than to another, and so the action exercised on prices would have its sway without any hindrance from the international movement ofmoney. Still, eventhen-it would,underthepresent circum-218 _ar_ BCONOMICZ0UR_.L [_U_ stances, have its obvious limits, As I remarked at the outset, the influence of credit or the rate of interest is only one of the factors acting on priz_es; _he other is the volume of metallic money itself, especially, in our times, the supply of gold, and so long as the gold itself remains the standard of value, this factor evidently will take the lead in the long run.
Were the production of gold materially to diminish while the demand for money be unaltered, the banks no doubt, by lowering their rate of interest, might for a while profitably react against the otherwise inevitable pressure on prices, but only for a while, because, even if the rather unneoess_ry stiffness of present bank legislations could be slackened, the ever-growing demand for gold for industrial purposes would gradualIy reduce _he bank stores, and could only be checked by raising the price of gold--that is, by lowering the average money prices.
The other extreme, which at present seems much more likely to occur : a plethora of gem supply, and the rise of prices thereby caused, could not be effectually met in any way, so long as free coinage of gold existsJ
On _he other hand, ff _his most essential step on the way to a rational monetary system should be taken, if the free coining • of golds like that of silver, should cease, and eventually the banknote itself, or rather the unity in which the accounts of banks are kept, should become the standard of value, then, and not till then, the problem of keeping the value of money steady, the i It is not easy t,odescribe' or irnJgine the exact manner in which an ezce_ or deficiencyin the ordinarygold supply affects pricme, although its ultimate effect on them cannot wellbe doubted. As in our days the new goldgenerallyfinds its way as scmu_ possible to th_ banks, the common impressionseems to be that it by so much increasesthe loan_blefunds o_ the hankssand thereforein the firstinstance causes Eae rate of interest to go down. This, no doubt, would be true if the new goldin its to_alityweredepositedby it_ owners as _v/t_l forlendingpurpo_, andin so far as this may be the case it indeedaffordsan illustration,and the onlypr&ctieM one, of the loweringo_bankr&t_eiteotinga rise of pri_ea.But mostty, I suppose,the gold comes to u_ not as lending capital,but as payment for the imports of the goldproducingcountries,and if so its acting on the priceswilt he much moreimmediate and its effectou the rate of interest veryslight. It is even possible that the rise of prices,caused by th_ increa_cd demand for commodities from the gold countries, will f_ the arrivingof the acid, the necessarymedium of exchangebeing in the meantime suppliedby an extansionof the credit,so that the rate of/nterest perhaps will rise from the beginning. In any case the u/J£_ts sheet of aa increased gold strpplywill be a r/ze, not a fall, in the rat_ of interest (andv/re v_tta with a lacking supplyof gold},because the largeminingenterprisesand the buyingup ofgold by the non.producingcountrieshave actually d_tr'oyadlarge amounts of real capital and therebygiven'the rateof profita tendency borise. This all may be the expl,_tmtiou of some rather perplexingfeatures in economichistory,&rise of prices even when &pparentlycausedby _ surplusofgold supply very seldom being amcompa_iedby a low rat_ of interest, but generallyby a high one.
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_19 average level of money prices at a constanf, height, which evidently is to be regarded as the fundamental problem of monetary science, would be solvable theoretically and practically to any extent. And the means of solvingit need not be sought in some more or lessfantastic scheme likethat of a centralissuingbank for alltheworld., as itissometimes proposed,but simplyin a proper manipulationof generalbank-rates, loweringthem when prices aregettinglow,and raising them when prices aregetting high.
Nor would thissystem be at allartificial, because the point about which the rate of interest would then oscillate, and to which it would constantly gravitate, would be precisely what I have calledabove itsnormal level, that one prescribed by the simultaneous sta_eof themarginalproductivity of realcapital, the alterations of which we, of course,cannot control, but only have to comply with. P.S._VChen thispaper was read at the BritishAssociation meetingitwas objected by Mr. Palgravethat _he banks couldnot possiblybe charged with the regulation of prices, theirliberty of action--if I understood him right--being, in his view, restricted by the necessity of protecting their own reserves as well from getting too low in consequenceof an unfavourable balanceof trade,as from runningto an unprofitable heightby an influx of gold. This, no doubt,is true, but itmust not be forgotten _hat the international rate policy of banks has, as it were, two degrees _] freedom, in so far as the international movement of gold can be checked or modified, not only by raising the rate of discount in the country ]rom which the metal flows, but also by lowering it in the country, or countries, to which gold is flowing. In other words, the action of the banks against each other, which has for its object _he proper distribution of money, or the levelling of the niveau of prices between different countries, might logically be concomitant wi_h a common action for the purpose of keeping the universal value of money and level of prices a_ a constant height, which, however, under present circumstances only can he done within the limits prescribed by the general supply of gold.
On the other hand, it was remarked by Professor Edgeworth that if the free coinage of gold be suppressed, the Governments themselves have in their hand the regulating of general prices. This, too, is true, at any rate so long _s the present large production of gold persists; and even if it should cease,and gold become scarce, the Governments, no doubt, m{ght supplant the lack in currency by a judicious emission of paper-money.
:But a single Government has in this respect only the choice between two alternatives: it may f_ry to keep the value of its money steady _owarda t/re commodities, but then it necessarily sacrifices the parity of its ex-
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_ _cosomc Jou_Ar, [_, 1907 ch_,nges, or else it may manage _o keep its exchanges strictly at par, but then it has of itself no power over the level of prices. Some internationsl sgreement, either regarding the _mount of gold to be coined by esch country or else involving a common rate-policy o4 the banks as described above, must needs come into plsy, shall both those purposes---the etes_liness of the average value of money and the parity of exchanges--be fulfilled together; and it seems to me, _lthough I may be mistaken, that for several reasons such agreements could be fax more easily end effectually mede by the banks, with the suppor_, that is, of _he Governments, than by the Doverrtme_ts themselves exclusive of bhe banks.
For a more detailed analysis of the practical side of the question an.d of _he whole argument, I must refer to my book, Gdd_ins und Ggterpreiso (Jena: Oustsv Fischer, 1898; being the £urtaher development of an article in Conrad's Jed_rbilcher, Bd. 13, 1807), as well as to my printed Unioarsity L_cture8 (Bd. I:2, 1006, in Swedish).
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